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Discursive Disparities 
Nancy Leong
∗
  
ABSTRACT 
Both within and beyond the legal profession, men write more 
than women.  Men publish more books; the books men write are re-
viewed more often in the most widely read forums; men write more of 
the reviews; men dominate the opinion pages of major news outlets; 
men write more of the articles in the most widely read magazines; and 
more men blog on the most widely read websites.  Even on Wikipe-
dia—widely hailed as a cyber-utopia open to anyone—more than 85% 
of entries are primarily authored by men.  This is true also in the legal 
realm.  Men write more judicial opinions.  Men author more legisla-
tion.  Men write more briefs—both for parties and as amici—before 
the Supreme Court.  Men write more law review articles, and their 
articles are published in more prominent journals.  Indeed, the dispar-
ity in legal scholarship begins in law school, where men publish a dis-
proportionate percentage of student notes. 
This Essay begins by suggesting several explanations for the gen-
der disparity in the amount of discursive space men and women oc-
cupy.  It then examines the consequences of that disparity.  It first em-
phasizes the harms to women that the disparity causes, with an em-
phasis on the legal profession.  Such harms include economic loss, 
damage to career, and diminished public influence.  These harms are 
serious in themselves.  Perhaps more importantly, however, the discur-
sive gender disparity means that men’s words dominate public dis-
course, and to control discourse is to control reality.  When men’s 
words, thoughts, ideas, and arguments constitute the overriding public 
narrative, the result is that men determine the texture of daily life on 
matters both trivial and grave.  The result of the discursive disparity is 
that male discourse exercises a disproportionate influence on our col-
lective consciousness. 
                                                                                                                           
 
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Many thanks to Re-
becca Aviel, Charlotte Garden, Justin Pidot, and Joyce Sterling for the conversations that helped 
to shape this Essay.  My gratitude to Kerri Stone and the members of the FIU Law Review for 
putting together an outstanding symposium. 
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The Essay concludes with preliminary suggestions for interven-
tions to ameliorate the discursive disparity. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“What knowledge have we of anything, save through our own 
minds?  All happenings are in the mind.  Whatever happens in all 
minds, truly happens.”
1
 
 
Men dominate our public discourse.  They disproportionately oc-
cupy our forums of communication, including books, news sources, 
magazines, and blogs.  The same is true within the legal realm, where 
men write far more judicial opinions, appellate briefs and other legal 
documents, scholarly publications, and legal commentary. 
But should we care? 
This Essay answers that question in the affirmative, arguing that 
the gender disparity in discursive participation harms women.  Con-
cretely, the disparity has negative consequences for women’s lives, 
careers, and personal well-being.  More broadly, the disparity distorts 
our discourse by conforming that discourse to male perspectives.  
Language, I will explain, constructs reality.  And when men dominate 
forums of communication, their linguistic dominance translates to a 
disproportionate influence on the perceived nature of the world we 
live in. 
I wish to make one important matter clear at the outset.  This Es-
say is avowedly anti-essentialist.2  I do not attribute any particular per-
spective to men, nor to women.  Rather, my point is that men and 
women have different experiences with society as a direct result of 
their respective genders; that over time those different experiences 
lead, in the aggregate, to some differences in perspectives and opin-
ions; and that across the realm of discourse, a disproportionate num-
ber of male contributors means that the discourse will differ in tangi-
ble ways.  
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the discursive 
gender disparity as an empirical matter, cataloging the many forums 
currently dominated by men.  Part II examines the consequences of 
the discursive disparity, first as a theoretical matter, and then within 
the specific context of the law and legal discourse.  Part III considers 
ways of adjusting discourse—both legal and cultural—as a means of 
mending gender inequity. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 248 (1949). 
 2 See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 581 (1990). 
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II. THE DISCURSIVE DISPARITY 
This Part traces the gap between the amount of discursive space 
that men occupy and the amount of discursive space that women oc-
cupy.  I begin with a brief survey of discourse generally, and then focus 
on the disparity within the law and legal context. 
A. In the World 
The relationship between gender and authorship has made the 
news recently.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, no one has examined 
that relationship systemically—that is, most studies and articles have 
reported on a single forum in which women are underrepresented 
rather than the underrepresentation of women in most forums in 
which people write.3 
With that said, it is worth a brief overview of the studies and re-
ports cataloging the scarcity of women as authors in a range of forums.  
Women author fewer articles in general print news sources.4  Women 
author fewer columns in widely-read opinion forums.5  Women author 
fewer novels reviewed in the most well-known book reviews.6  There 
are fewer women bloggers, and the most well-known bloggers are 
primarily men.7  Some influential blogs remain entirely male in their 
permanent authorship.8  Even on Wikipedia, widely hailed as a cyber-
utopia readily accessible by anyone, women author only thirteen per-
cent of entries.9 
We are so accustomed to this discursive disparity that, for the 
most part, we do not notice it.  We do not think about the fact that the 
only two women on the New York Times’ opinion page are Maureen 
Dowd and Gail Collins; it is simply a fact.  The Modern Library Asso-
ciation announces a list of the “100 Best Books” that includes only 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See infra notes 4-10 (listing examples describing forums in which women are underrep-
resented). 
 4 Amy King, The Count 2010, VIDA, http://vidaweb.org/the-count-2010 (last visited Oct. 
12, 2011). 
 5 See, e.g., James Rainey, A Very Public Opinion Exchange, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2005), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/11/entertainment/et-estrich11; Dahlia Lithwick, Girl Fight, 
SLATE (Mar. 16, 2005, 5:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2114926/. 
 6 Laura Miller, Literature’s Gender Gap, SALON (Feb. 9, 2011, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/books/laura_miller/2011/02/09/women_literary_publishing. 
 7 Kara Jesella, Blogging’s Glass Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/fashion/27blogher.html (explaining that while fourteen per-
cent of men blog, as compared to eleven percent of women, the most well-known bloggers ac-
cording to recent rankings by Techcult and Forbes are almost entirely men).  
 8 See, e.g., THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.volokh.com.  As of February 8, 2013, all 
twenty-one of the blog’s contributors were men. 
 9 Noam Coan, Define Gender Gap? Look up Wikipedia’s Contributor List, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/business/media/31link.html.  
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eight books by women10—a list that is distributed in high school class-
rooms across the English-speaking world—and there is little protest in 
response.11  The gender disparity in discourse is taken as a given—
simply something that is real about the world. 
The discursive disparity is so prevalent that it permeates areas 
where we do not even recognize it.  I could offer many examples, but 
given the brevity of this essay, consider just one.  Even our naming 
conventions divest women of discursive space.  A presumption re-
mains that women should change their last names upon marriage to a 
man—indeed, a 2009 study found that 70% of Americans believe this 
should be legally required.12  To be clear, I am not at all opposed to a 
woman making that choice.  I think that everyone ought to do with 
their names what they wish—both men and women, and both after 
marriage and otherwise.13  But there are many stories of women pres-
sured into the choice by their husbands or families.  A name is often in 
itself a communicative act14—and usurping control of another’s name 
is a method of silencing.15 
My hope is that this admittedly brief survey of the gender dispar-
ity in various forms of discourse and communication is sufficient to 
persuade the reader that it exists in the world generally.  I next turn to 
the specific realm of the law. 
B. In the Law 
The discursive gender disparity extends to the realm of law and 
legal discourse.  We often hear that women are now half of all law stu-
dents,16 but a gross disparity remains within most segments of the pro-
                                                                                                                           
 10 Modern Library’s 100 Best Novels, MODERN LIBRARY, http://www.modernlibrary. 
com/top-100/100-best-novels/ (last updated 2013). 
 11 Certainly some commentators noted the homogeneity of the list, but googling the list 
brings up very few criticisms.  Rather, we find blog posts by bibliophiles pledging to read the 
entire list, or teachers debating which selections are appropriate for their classes.  
 12 Jillian Berman, 70% Say Brides Should Take Husband’s Name, USA TODAY, (Aug. 11, 
2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-08-11-change-name_N.htm?csp=34. 
 13 Nancy Leong, What’s in a Name?  For Married Women, a Lifetime of Effort, FEMINIST 
LAW PROFESSORS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/01/whats-
married-women-lot-work/. 
 14 Consider, for example, people who change their names—the new name often communi-
cates something about the person’s place in the world.  Jessica Steinhauser, for example, gained 
fame, success, and wealth in the porn industry only after she changed her name to Asia Carrera, 
thereby invoking stereotypes of Asian female sexuality for profit.   
 15 For example, women with ethnically-identified last names sometimes speak of their 
sense of identity loss upon changing their name to match that of a husband of another race. 
 16 This does not appear to be true for women who attend the top fifty schools, as ranked by 
U.S. News and World Report.  Research spanning 1999-2009 found that women comprised only 
47% of the student body at these schools.  Jennifer Mullins & Nancy Leong, The Persistent Gen-
der Disparity in Student Note Publication, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 392-93 (2011). 
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fession.  It exists within the judiciary:  only three of the nine Supreme 
Court justices are women; 51 of 162 federal appellate judges are 
women, or about 31%; and approximately 30% of federal district 
court judges are women.17  This means, of course, that only about a 
third of judicial opinions are by women—that is, are direct contribu-
tions by women to judicial discourse. 
The disparity is likewise present in litigation.  Women author 
fewer merits briefs before the Supreme Court.18  They are only 15% of 
the partners at big law firms,19 who contribute to external legal dis-
course through representation and litigation, and to internal legal dis-
course by shaping the culture of the firm.20 
Disparities also permeate legal education.  Only 37.3% of ten-
ured and tenure-track professors are women.21  But this disparity 
grows even greater when we examine the written work that originates 
from the legal academy: only 32% of law review articles are by 
women, and the disparity is even more significant at the “most prestig-
ious” law reviews, with women publishing 20.4% of articles in those 
venues.22  The same disparity troubles student note publication: my 
previous study of every student note published over ten years at the 
“top fifty” law schools found that women published only about a third 
of the student notes in question.23  Other research has found that 
women participate less frequently in class, making the aural experi-
ence of law school one sounding primarily in male voices.24  And the 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENTER 
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-go-1; see 
also Federal Bench Gender Snapshot, THE THIRD BRANCH, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-01/Federal_Bench_Gender_Snapshot.asp 
x (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
 18 Tammy A. Sarver, Erin B. Kaheny & John J. Szmer, The Attorney Gender Gap in U.S. 
Supreme Court Litigation, 91 JUDICATURE 238, 242 (2008) (finding that from 1993-2001 women 
were only 25.52% of attorneys listed on Supreme Court merits briefs, and that women argued 
only 13.91% of Supreme Court cases). 
 19 BARBARA M. FLOM, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL NAWL NATIONAL SURVEY ON 
RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NAWL%202012%20Survey%20Report%20final.pdf. 
 20 Eli Wald, Glass-ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and 
the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2247-49 (2010). 
 21 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCH., available at 
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/gender.html. 
 22 See Minna Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of Gender Disparity 
and Privilege in the ‘Top Ten’ Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 385, 398 & fig. 4 (2010). 
 23 Mullins & Leong, supra note 16, at 398. 
 24 Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin, Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at 
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (1994) (finding that women felt more 
alienated than men by the Socratic method  and were consequently less likely than men to speak 
in class, and finding that this silence contributed to women’s alienation from the law school 
experience); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal 
 
374 FIU Law Review [8:369 
materials—at least during the first year curriculum—tend to consist 
almost exclusively of writings by men.25  For example, most seminal 
judicial opinions are by men—unsurprisingly, since there have only 
been four women Supreme Court Justices in history, and the first was 
not appointed until 1981.26  Collectively, these various factors combine 
to make law school a place that—while not wholly exclusive of female 
perspectives—is nonetheless dominated by male discourse.27 
III. CONSTRUCTING REALITY 
Language constructs reality.  We know this intuitively and recog-
nize it when we see it.  George Orwell’s 1984 famously communicated 
the idea that whoever controls language controls reality.28  The oppres-
sive government in that novel asserted the power to command that 
2+2=5—the ability to instill belief in what is patently false reveals the 
ultimate ability to control reality.29  As the protagonist Winston is told 
during one torture session:  “There are three stages in your reintegra-
tion. . . . [t]here is learning, there is understanding, and there is accep-
tance” of the Party’s assertion of what is true.30 
If language constructs reality, then those who control the dis-
course also control what is real.  It follows that when discourse is dis-
proportionally male, that male perspective constructs our perceptions 
of reality.  This Part explores this insight, first as a theoretical matter, 
then within the realm of the law. 
                                                                                                                           
Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy, and Discourse, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 847, 879–85 
(2000) (describing women’s experiences with classroom silencing); Adam Neufeld, Costs of an 
Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 AM. U. J.GENDER, SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 511, 522 (2005) (examining legal education at Harvard Law School); Claire G. Schwab, A 
Shifting Gender Divide: The Impact of Gender on Education at Columbia Law School in the New 
Millennium, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 318 (2003) (examining legal education at Co-
lumbia Law School); Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 403-17 (2006).  
 25 Given that most first year casebooks focus on the “seminal” cases in traditional doctrinal 
subjects, and that most of the seminal cases were decided before 1981, these cases are by and 
large authored by men. 
 26 That Justice was Sandra Day O’Connor; she has since been followed by Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. 
 27 Of course, this varies a great deal from one institution to the next.  For example, in my 
longitudinal examination of student note publication, some law reviews showed massive dispari-
ties in the number of notes published by women and by men, while others showed no disparity at 
all.  Mullins & Leong, supra note 16.  Likewise, some schools have nearly equal numbers of men 
and women on faculty, while others display a marked disparity. 
 28 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 259 (1949). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 216. 
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A. Performance Through Language 
The philosopher of language, J.L. Austin, introduced the idea of 
“performative utterances”—that is, statements that do not merely de-
scribe facts about the world, but that when uttered under certain cir-
cumstances are tantamount to performing a certain kind of action.31  
For example: “I now pronounce you husband and wife.”  The words 
are not merely descriptive of the world; when uttered at a wedding 
ceremony, they actually create change. 
Closer to home, consider the following phrase in a judicial opin-
ion:  “Counsel for the defendant did not raise the argument.”32  The 
phrase is more than merely descriptive.  It is critical: counsel should 
have raised the argument.  It is performative: because counsel did not 
raise the argument, the court will not consider it.  And, of course, it is 
predictive:  because counsel did not raise the argument, the defendant 
will not prevail upon it.  Taken in context, then, this simple declarative 
sentence embodies far more about the world than the raw meaning of 
its individual words. 
The gender disparity in discourse thus has significance beyond 
the actual words and statements that men disproportionately commu-
nicate.   
B. Legal Realities 
What are the consequences of the discursive disparity?  Certainly 
there are tangible consequences for women’s lives and careers.  A 
woman excluded from legal academia cannot make her opinions 
heard by courts, commentators, advocates, and fellow academics.  A 
woman who is driven away from blogging by cyber harassment loses 
the visibility and exposure to her career that a robust online presence 
generates.   
In the aggregate, these harms are concrete.  Women’s careers may 
stagnate; they may suffer economic loss over a lifetime; they may 
never have the same opportunity for public influence as their male 
counterparts; they may find themselves unhappy in their legal careers; 
they may leave the legal realm altogether.  These consequences are 
easy to see. 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975). 
 32 I do not detail here Austin’s complex and fascinating theory of “illocutionary acts,” as 
distinct from other kinds of speech acts, or the notion of an “illocutionary force.”  The basic 
notion that speech may be constitutive rather than merely descriptive will suffice for present 
purposes. 
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But there are also consequences beyond the fates of individual 
women, or even women as a group.33  The disparities I discussed in 
Part I(B) unsurprisingly add up to a collective acknowledgment that 
men’s views are more audible, more pervasive, and more influential 
than women’s.  For example, a poll run by Legal Affairs included only 
three women in a list of the twenty most influential legal thinkers, and 
the seven legal scholars on the list were all men.34  The result is that 
men disproportionately control legal discourse, and, hence, legal reali-
ties and legal outcomes.  Moreover, the law touches every aspect of 
daily life—by its absence as well as its presence.  Thus, when men’s 
words, thoughts, ideas, and arguments constitute the overriding public 
narrative, the result is that men determine the texture of daily life on 
matters both grave and trivial.   
Let me offer a few more concrete examples.  Women who do not 
author briefs do not have the opportunity to persuade courts of their 
perspectives.35  Women who do not write articles—who were often 
women who did not write student notes—do not become law profes-
sors, and thus lose the opportunity to influence courts, commentators, 
students, and fellow academics with their ideas.  Women who do not 
blog lose the opportunity to reach, influence, and persuade a broad, 
generalist audience with their opinions and insights.  Women who 
leave the practice of law after a few years of frustration and disap-
pointment do not become law firm partners, leaders in the public in-
terest world, or members of the state and federal judiciaries, and thus 
lose the platform that these prestigious positions would provide.  
The net effect is that the discursive disparity I have described re-
sults in a suppression of women’s ideas and views.  Of course, I do not 
claim that such views are altogether suppressed.  But I worry that they 
are drowned out, or given insufficient time, in a discursive world that 
is numerically dominated by men. 
IV. DIMINISHING THE DISPARITY 
The discursive disparity within the legal profession could be less-
ened in two ways:  women could write more, or men could write less.  I 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Of course, I do not mean to trivialize these individual and group harms.  I do, however, 
want to call attention to a consequence that I think is vastly under-discussed—the harm to dis-
course itself. 
 34 Who Are the Top 20 Legal Thinkers in America?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/poll/ (last visited May 29, 2013). 
 35 As I noted in the Introduction, I am not suggesting that women have a single unitary 
perspective on any issue.  My point is that men and women have different experiences with 
society as a direct result of their respective gender; that over time those different experiences 
lead, in the aggregate, to different perspectives; and that over the course of many legal briefs we 
would expect these different perspectives to yield different arguments. 
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am more inclined to the former approach and will focus on that ap-
proach here, while adding a couple of thoughts about the latter at the 
end. 
As to how we could inspire more participation in discourse by 
women, we might do so in two ways.  One suite of interventions would 
remove barriers to entering the discourse for women.  The other 
would create incentives for women to enter existing discourses, per-
haps in spite of those barriers. 
As to the former, legal mechanisms may help us.  We ought to 
consider carefully the various obstacles that prevent women from 
achieving equal voice within the profession.  This might require a 
more expansive notion of what constitutes discrimination within the 
workplace and its long-term consequences on women’s lives.  A 
woman who has experienced sexual harassment at a law firm, for ex-
ample, is unlikely to linger long enough to make partner.36  Many of 
my colleagues have proposed what I see as sensible amendments to 
current workplace law governing gender discrimination.37  In my view, 
we ought to include discursive impediments as one consequence of 
sexual harassment and hostile work environments, both in construct-
ing the substantive doctrine itself and in considering appropriate 
damages and other remedies. 
Likewise, a range of scholars have examined the phenomenon of 
cyber harassment and the way that it excludes women from the world 
of online discourse.38  Scholars have proposed ways of regulating cy-
berspace to make it safe for women to speak in online forums.39  While 
my project here is not to weigh in on the merits of the various propos-
als, surely one way to balance online discourse is to deploy tort and 
criminal law to improve the safety of online environments for women 
who wish to share their ideas there. 
A cultural, rather than legal, shift to online civility will also lessen 
the discursive disparity.  Recent commentary has wondered why we 
are so impolite to one another online.40  Beyond legal interventions, 
websites could voluntarily adopt civility codes as a condition of par-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See, e.g., Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy J. Reichman, So, You Want to be a Lawyer? The Quest 
for Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289 (2010). 
 37 Such scholarship is voluminous; I list only a small sample here.  See, e.g., Susan Grover & 
Kimberley Piro, Consider the Source: When the Harasser is the Boss, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 499 
(2010); Kerri Stone, Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment are Faring 
Better in Court Than Those Who Say No . . . And Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 
25 (2008). 
 38 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Elizabeth Bernstein, Why We Are So Rude Online, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592404578030351784405148.html. 
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ticipation.  This would not make cyberspace as a whole safe for 
women.  But it would create safe environments—perhaps many safe 
environments—where women’s views could be heard. 
The latter mechanism—reducing the discursive disparity by facili-
tating participation by women—is more difficult because it is more 
difficult to envision how the law might intervene.  That is, one cannot 
legally require women to write more.  An interesting thought experi-
ment involves statutorily requiring a certain level of gender diversity 
in written content by all publications with a minimum level of circula-
tion.  Of course, the First Amendment challenges would likely render 
such a regime legally untenable.  But nothing would prevent publica-
tions from voluntarily adopting what cannot be required by statute. 
Finally, I wonder whether one way of increasing participation in 
discourse might be discourse itself.  Awareness is sometimes enough to 
produce positive change.  Admittedly, my evidence is only anecdotal, 
but as I have presented my work on the gender disparity in student 
note publication before various law reviews, several young women 
have told me that as a result of the presentation they felt increased 
motivation to produce publishable scholarship during their legal ca-
reer.  Perhaps the simple act of paying more attention to the disparity 
might lead to its diminishment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The full participation of women in the discourse that constructs 
our lives and our realities is a prerequisite for true substantive equal-
ity between men and women.  I hope that our lifetimes will see the 
dissipation of the gender disparity in discourse.  I believe that talking 
about that disparity—as we have done at this symposium—is the first 
step. 
 
